Corporate governance and opportunistic insider trades

摘要：

We use U.S. top executives insider trades to develop an opportunistic insider trade proxy. Consistent with our proxy representing residual managerial agency costs, we show that our proxy is negatively associated with future earnings performance and contemporaneous firm value. In addition, our opportunistic insider trade proxy is positively associated with two alternative indicators of managerial opportunism, earnings misstatements and illegal stock option backdating, suggesting that different forms of managerial opportunism are positively correlated.

作者: Katherine Gunny Bin Ke Tracey Chunqi Zhang

作者单位: Leeds School of Business University of Colorado at Boulder Smeal College of Business Pennsylvania State University School of Accountancy Singapore Management University

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: 2008年中国金融国际年会

会议地点: 大连

会议语种:英文

页码: 1-51

在线出版日期: 2008-07-02（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）