Mandatory vs. contractual disclosure in securities markets: Evidence from the 1930s
This paper studies the effect of initial mandatory disclosure documents filed under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Our sample companies are listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and subject to its disclosure requirements at the time of the regulatory filings. To establish a baseline, we first document that listed firms experience abnormal volatility and trading volumes around the time of earnings announcements. When listed companies later make their initial Exchange Act disclosures, however, there in no similar market reaction, suggesting that the additional legally mandated disclosures-principally having to do with management compensation and ownership structure-did not contain value-relevant information as to companies already subject to NYSE disclosure rules.
Paul G. Mahoney Jianping Mei
University of Virginia School of Law 580 Massie Road Charlottesville,VA22903 Cheung Kong Graduate School of Business
国际会议
大连
英文
1-45
2008-07-02（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）