Board Leadership Structure, Political Dynamics, and CEO Turnovers: Evidence from China’s Listed Firms
This study examines how CEO duality affects CEO turnovers in firms with different levels of financial performance. It is shown that CEO duality is related negatively with turnovers in profit-making firms but not in loss-making firms. Among profit-making firms, CEO duality is related negatively to disciplinary turnovers in average-performing firms and nondisciplinary turnovers in out-performing firms. The results indicate that CEO duality entrenches CEOs of average-performing firms but not loss-making firms. Furthermore, it contributes to the firm governance of out-performing firms by protecting their CEOs from the vagaries of organizational politics. This study suggests that the agency theory and the organizational theory of CEO duality are not mutually exclusive.
board leadership structure CEO duality CEO turnover corporate governance
Sonia M. L. Wong Yang Yong
Department of Finance and Insurance, Lingnan University, Tuen Mun, Hong Kong Department of Statistics and Finance University of Science and Technology of China
国际会议
成都
英文
1-47
2007-07-09（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）