Large Shareholders, Board of Directors and the Payperformance Link: An Australian Experience
This paper examines executive pay-performance link of large Australian listed corporations, and the possible impact of concentrated ownership and board characteristics on this link. The empirical results, based on a sample of 149 large Australian firms over the period of 2003-2005, indicate that compensations for top executives are associated with various firm performance measures. We find that the presence of large investors tend to increases pay-performance link, consistent with the notion that large shareholders, especially institutional shareholders serve as a monitoring role and thus help reduce agency problem. Our results also indicate that various board features, including independence and the separation of chairman from CEO, seem to have little influence on the executive pay-performance link.
Executive Compensation Corporate Performance Ownership Structure Institutional Investors Board of Directors Australia
Gloria Tian Garry Twite
Australian Graduate School of Management, University of New South Wales, Sydney, NSW, 2052 Australian Graduate School of Management University of New South Wales
国际会议
成都
英文
1-33
2007-07-09（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）