The Effect of Investment Horizon on Institutional Investors Incentives to Acquire Private Information on Long-Term Earnings

摘要：

We find that short-horizon institutions possess private information on long-term earnings that will be reflected in near term stock prices but do not have private information on long-term earnings that will be reflected in stock prices beyond the near term. In contrast, we find no evidence that long-horizon institutions have private information on long-term earnings, regardless of whether the private information will be reflected in near term stock prices or not. Our results question the notion that long-horizon institutions have a stronger incentive than short-horizon institutions to acquire private information on longterm firm value.

作者: Bin Ke Santhosh Ramalingegowda

作者单位: Smeal College of Business Pennsylvania State University Pennsylvania State University 226 Beam Build Smeal College of Business Pennsylvania State University

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: 2006年中国金融国际年会

会议地点: 西安

会议语种:英文

页码: 1-34

在线出版日期: 2006-07-17（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）