Motivating entrepreneurial activity in a firm

摘要：

We consider the problem of motivating privately informed managers to engage in entrepreneurial activity to improve the quality of the firms investment opportunities. The firms investment and compensation policy must balance the managers incentives to provide entrepreneurial e.ort and to report her private information truthfully. The optimal policy is to underinvest (compared to first-best) and provide weak incentive pay in low-quality projects and overinvest (compared to first-best) and provide strong incentive pay in high-quality projects. We also show that, unlike the standard agency model, uncertainty and incentives can be positively related.

作者: Antonio E. Bernardo Hongbin Cai Jiang Luo

作者单位: UCLA Anderson School, 110 Westwood Plaza Box 951481, Los Angeles, CA 90095-1481, USA Department of Economics, UCLA, Los Angeles, CA 90095-1477, USA Department of Finance, HKUST, Clear Water Bay, Hong Kong

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: 2005年中国金融国际年会

会议地点: 昆明

会议语种:英文

页码: 1-34

在线出版日期: 2005-07-05（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）