Disclosure Policies of Investment Companies
We examine voluntary and mandated disclosure of portfolio holdings by investment companies (ICs) in a model where ICs are characterized as having a stream of investment ideas and providing liquidity to investors through redemptions. We show that the greater the IC’s liquidity provision role, the more aggressively the IC trades on its ideas and the stronger is its preference to disclose voluntarily information about its holdings. We also show that mandatory disclosure can appear to increase competition when, in fact, it decreases information available in securities markets by crowding out private information acquisition. Our model’s predictions are consistent with stylized facts (documented by others) that ICs take aggressive positions in response to poor performance and that disclosure has an asymmetric effect on the future performance of well versus poorly performing ICs.
Thomas J. George Chuan-Yang Hwang
C. T. Bauer College of Business University of Houston Houston, TX 77240 Division of Banking and Finance Nanyang Business School Nanyang Technological University Singapore 6
国际会议
昆明
英文
1-49
2005-07-05（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）