Undoing the Powerful Anti-Takeover Force of Staggered Boards
In this paper we examine cases where managers announce an intention to de-stagger their boards via either proxy proposals or board action. The literature has now established the staggered board as arguably the most consequential of all available takeover defenses. Thus, the dismantling of this structure in favor of annual director elections has important implications for shareholder rights and wealth. We study the wealth effects and motives behind this change in governance. Our results are consistent with the view that forcing directors to face annual election is good for shareholders. Moreover, it is firms with better governance and more active shareholders that are more likely to act in the interest of shareholders.
Re-Jin Guo Timothy Kruse Tom Nohel
University of Illinois – Chicago University of Arkansas Loyola University – Chicago
国际会议
昆明
英文
1-33
2005-07-05（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）