Effect of Personal Taxes on Managers’ Decision to Sell Unrestricted Equity
We examine how personal taxes affect CEOs’ decision to sell their vested equity and compare it against diversification, managerial overconfidence and other determinants of CEOs’ sale of equity. While CEOs frequently sell large amounts of their unrestricted firm equity, we find that the tax burden associated with the sale deters CEOs from selling their equity. The effect of taxes remains significant even after controlling for other determinants of CEOs’ sale of equity. We also find that taxable institutional investors and CEOs both respond to taxes in their selling of equity, although the CEOs appear to be less tax-sensitive. Other determinants affect CEOs’ selling decisions largely as predicted in the existing literature.
Executive Compensation Taxation Overconfidence Behavioral Finance Institutional investors
Li Jin S.P. Kothari
Harvard Business School Baker Library 343 Boston, MA 02163 Harvard Business School Morgan 381 Sloan School of Management Massachusetts Institute of Technology
国际会议
昆明
英文
1-58
2005-07-05(万方平台首次上网日期,不代表论文的发表时间)