Managerial Career Concerns and Risk Management

摘要：

We present a dynamic model of corporate risk management and managerial career concerns. We show that managers with high (low) career concerns are more likely to speculate (hedge) early in their careers. In the later stage of their careers when managers have less career concerns, there is no speculative motive for self interested managers. On the other hand, managers with minimal career concerns engage in neither hedging nor speculation early in their careers, but they may choose to hedge after poor early performance.

作者: Jouahn Nam Jun Wang Ge Zhang

作者单位: Lubin School of Business, Pace University, New York, NY, 10038 LSU and Baruch College, Department of Finance, Baton Rouge, LA 70803 Department of Economics and Finance, College of Business Administration, University of New Orleans,

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: 2005年中国金融国际年会

会议地点: 昆明

会议语种:英文

页码: 1-32

在线出版日期: 2005-07-05（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）