Integral Optimal Research on Ordering Financing Based on Supply Chain Finance

摘要：

Because of asymmetry information between the bank and the business, there appears the problem of SME financing difficulty. How staged financing can alleviate moral hazard is deeply studied. We design optimal decision-making model of staged loaning with perfect information and without renegotiation under the model of turnkey with integration consignment and conclude that staged loaning could control moral hazard when used together with a sharing contract.

关键词： Supply chain finance Ordering finance Staged finance Principal-agent

作者: Juan Li Yu Xu Tao Jia

作者单位: Postdoctorate of applied economics, Renmin University of China, Beijing，100872,China School of Management, Xi′an Jiaotong University, Xi’an, 710049,China

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: The Ninth Wuhan International Conference on E-Business(第九届武汉电子商务国际会议)

会议地点: 武汉

会议语种:英文

页码: 1119-1125

在线出版日期: 2010-05-29（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）