Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard in Enterprise’s Informatization Construction

摘要：

Informatization construction in enterprises is a common principal-agent relationship problem，and the enterprises may have two information behaviors—adverse selection and moral hazard in this relationship. This paper first analyses the adverse selection situation from the viewpoint of lemon theory which is one of the famous information-asymmetry theories and then elaborates it. Against the enterprises’ moral hazard representation in the activity, its causes are analyzed from the viewpoint of information economics. At last the proposed countermeasures will constrain the information behaviors of the two parties——enterprises and software suppliers——in the informatization construction activity.

关键词： informatization construction adverse selection moral hazard

作者: Limei Zhao Qingpu Zhang

作者单位: School of Management ,Harbin Institute of Technology, Harbin ,150001, China Information Management S School of Management ,Harbin Institute of Technology, Harbin ,150001, China

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: The Ninth Wuhan International Conference on E-Business(第九届武汉电子商务国际会议)

会议地点: 武汉

会议语种:英文

页码: 2385-2390

在线出版日期: 2010-05-29（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）