Sellers Reputation Problem in Self-Enforcing Relational Contracts
This paper addresses the level of cooperation that can be blicited from a suppler to bring down costs in a self-enforcing relational contract.With the growing concern of the detrimental effects of the rising eosts of input resources on suppliersbottom lines,supply chain researchers are beginning to gropose contracts in which the buyer assumes the risk of the suppliers pro-duction cost increases.While these works have assumed that for the sake of future business, the supplier will always serve the buyers interest in such contracts,this paper (ongoing work) seeks to investigate the relationship between the suppliers optimal level of cost saving efforts and the magnitude of the potential loss of future business.With an understanding of the sup pliers optimal policy,the buyers optimal review policy will then be analyzed,and analytical and numerical results would be derived to show the dependence of each partys behavior on the parameters of the problem.
Mojiaola Otegbeye
Department of Mechanical and Industrial Engineering, NJIT. Newark, NJ 07102.Cheickna Sylla School of Management, CAB, NJIT, Newark, NJ 07102
国际会议
The Ninth Wuhan International Conference on E-Business(第九届武汉电子商务国际会议)
武汉
英文
2648-2653
2010-05-29（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）