Game Analysis of Engineering Cost Auditing Collusion Based on the Principal-Agent

摘要：

The completion settlement of a project is the last and key link for owners to control the construction investment. Aiming at the phenomenon of the auditing collusion, analyzed the motivation between the contractors and auditors based on the principal-agent theory; studied on the game relationship among relevant benefits agent; set up the game model among the owner, the auditor and the contractor; and carried on game analysis of the strategy among them; discussed the results of game analysis, and at last put forward countermeasures to govern the rent-seeking activities between auditors and contractors effectively.

关键词： principal-agent engineering cost auditing collusion game analysis

作者: WANG Guangliang

作者单位: Department of Accounting, Harbin Institute of Technology, Harbin, China 150001

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: 2009 International Conference on Construction & Real Estate Management(2009建设与房地产管理国际会议)

会议地点: 北京

会议语种:英文

页码: 239-242

在线出版日期: 2009-11-05（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）