Play Reputation Mechanism Effectively by Phases Injection Restriction on Venture Entrepreneurs

摘要：

Reputation Mechanism can play a role in solving agent problems. However, because of severe information asymmetry, imperfect social reputation mechanism and other reasons, to a large extent, venture capitalists select venture entrepreneurs with the characteristics of disposable, which make the restriction effects of reputation mechanism to entrepreneurs sharply disvalued. This paper focusing on the modus operandi that venture capitalists often select a phased manner in order to reduce the injection of investment risk in practice, use KMRW reputation model analysis, theoretically prove that staged financing can enhance the constraint of reputation mechanisms to venture entrepreneurs.

关键词： venture capitalist (VC) venture entrepreneur (EN) KMRW reputation model repeated game

作者: ZHOU Zuowei TIAN Yezhuang SHEN Binjiang

作者单位: School of Management, Harbin Institute ofTechnology, Harbin China 150001 School of Management, Harbin Institute of Technology,Harbin, China 150001 School of Management, Harbin Institute of Technology, Harbin China 150001

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: 2009 International Conference on Construction & Real Estate Management(2009建设与房地产管理国际会议)

会议地点: 北京

会议语种:英文

页码: 351-353

在线出版日期: 2009-11-05（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）