Research on the Principal-Agent Game of Multi-incentive Mechanism for DB Subcontract in CSPC
The importance of cooperative relationship of construction supply project chain (CSPC) in design-building (DB) contract is due to subcontractor’s decision making of the resource distribution and multi-objectives control behavior influences the entire performance as agent of the subcontract project. And one of the main risk resources is from the moral hazard and opportunism behavior of subcontractors. However, the existing single-factor incentive system can not deal with the corporation of project multi-objectives control for the whole CSPC. Therefore, based on the principal-agent game, this paper establishes the multi-objective incentive model from the angle of general contractor to subcontract and analyzes the solution procedure. The incentive strategy of the multi-objective subcontract is presented either to improve the income of both the GC and the subcontractor. These conclusions can be helpful in the mechanism design of procurement contract and subcontract.
principal-agent game multi-incentive mechanism design-building contract
LI Ning WANG Yaowu YAO Bing
Department of Construction and Real Estate, HarbinInstitute of Technology, Harbin, China Department of Construction and Real Estate, Harbin Institute of Technology, Harbin, China
国际会议
2009 International Conference on Construction & Real Estate Management(2009建设与房地产管理国际会议)
北京
英文
434-438
2009-11-05（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）