Game Analysis on Cost Information Disclosure of Security Housing Price

摘要：

Information asymmetry seriously impacts the regulation of the government to the security housing price. Based on the Principal-agent theory, the government supervises the real estate developer to disclose the cost information of constructing security housing. This paper analyzes the complete information static game between the government and the real estate developer about the cost information disclosure and the hybrid Nash Equilibrium is educed. To the degree of accuracy of the cost information reported by the real estate developer, the evolutionary game theory is employed to discuss the colony evolutionary process of the government and the real estate developer. In conclusion, some suggestion for the government to supervise the behavior of the real estate developer to disclose the real cost information is presented.

关键词： information disclosure game analysis pincipal-agent

作者: ZHANG Yu YAO Bing

作者单位: Department of Management and Engineering,Tianjin Institute of Urban Construction, Tianjin, China Department of Construction and Real Estate, Harbin Institute of Technology, Harbin, China

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: 2009 International Conference on Construction & Real Estate Management(2009建设与房地产管理国际会议)

会议地点: 北京

会议语种:英文

页码: 1039-1042

在线出版日期: 2009-11-05（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）