Mechanism Design of Investment Compensation on Public Welfare Hydraulic Engineering Based on Game Theory
The paper studies the game behaviors in public welfare hydraulic engineering and analyzes the investors investment decision-making. It proves that the government could induce investors behaviors by tuning investment compensation ratio and made investors investment decision-making be satisfied with Nash equilibrium under the optimized investment compensation ratio α(0<α≤1). The result shows that a basic entrance standard should be established to ensure the participants are competitive; when there are 2 competitive participants in the project after bidding, the expected investment equilibrium will achieve an economized total compensation cost and reduce social welfare loss. The paper provides a basis of mechanism design about fiscal compensation on public welfare hydraulic engineering.
hydraulic engineering investment compensation mechanism design game theory
Yu Haidong Tang Wenhui Tian Qihua Ji Bingan
Library, China Three Gorges University, Yichang, 443002, China Institute of Systems Engineering, Huazhong University of Science and Technology, Wuhan, 430074, Chin
国际会议
郑州
英文
2062-2065
2009-10-20（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）