A Two-Party Certificateless Authenticated Key Agreement Protocol without Pairing
Authenticated key agreement (AK) protocol is crucial in providing data confidentiality and integrity for subsequent communications among two or more parties over a public network. Certificateless public key cryptography (CLPKC) combines the advantage of the identity-based public key cryptography (ID-PKC) and the traditional public key cryptography (PKC). Unfortunately, construction of CL-PKC and AK protocols has so far depended on the use of identitybased encryption, which results in the bilinear pairing-based schemes that need costly operations. We present a secure certificateless authenticated key agreement protocol without paring, based on the certificateless encryption scheme proposed by J. Baek et al. It shows that the newly proposed scheme is of nice efficiency and practical. Moreover, it provides perfect forward secrecy, PKG forward secrecy and almost all the other known security attributes, such as knownkey secrecy, key-compromise impersonation resilience, unknown key-share resilience, known session-specific temporary information security, message independence and no key control.
authenticated key agreement certificateless-based cryptography PKG forward secrecy perfect forward secrecy
Mengbo Hou Qiuliang Xu
School of Computer Science and Technology Shandong University Jinan, 250101, China
国际会议
北京
英文
412-416
2009-08-08（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）