Research on Game of Moral Hazard Activity in Charge of the Third-Party Supervisor

摘要：

The key problem of funds supervision is to eliminate the moral hazard produced by funds managers. However, the internal and external supervision can not eliminate the moral hazard completely. This paper introduces the malpractice analysis of internal supervision, external supervision and the current structure of third-party supervision. Accordingly, it is important to build an effective third-party supervision system to restrict stock investment funds managers moral hazard.

关键词： Fund Supervision the Third-Party Supervision Moral hazard

作者: Jingting Ma Shumei Wang

作者单位: Institute of Business Administration of Shenyang University, Shenyang 110044 Intenational Business College of Shenyang University, Shenyang 110044

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: The First World Congress on Global Optimization in Engineering & Science(第一届工程与科学全局优化国际会议 WCGO2009)

会议地点: 长沙

会议语种:英文

页码: 39-44

在线出版日期: 2009-06-01（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）