The Game Analysis of Enterprises Cooperative Innovation Behaviors in Industrial Clusters

摘要：

The enterprises in industrial clusters are in the dynamic change of competition and cooperation. There is a complex competition and cooperation relationships among enterprises which directly influence their innovation behaviors. The article analyzes the inevitability of the cooperation between enterprises in clusters through incomplete information dynamic game, and then we construct double-person cooperation game model. After we analyze the utility function and clear up the elementary model, we can get that the enterprises will select to increase the R&D investments to maximize their profit functions, and to increase the rate of the exclusive funds in order to enhance the technique exclusive level. The enterprises will also reduce the running-in period costs to promote the virtuous circle of cooperation innovation relationships between enterprises in clusters, and then occupy an advantaged position in the process of profit distributing.

关键词： Industrial cluster Cooperation innovation Cooperation game

作者: Zhenfa Qi Lei Liu Mengqi Li

作者单位: Management School, Shandong University of Technology, Zibo, China, 255049

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: The First World Congress on Global Optimization in Engineering & Science(第一届工程与科学全局优化国际会议 WCGO2009)

会议地点: 长沙

会议语种:英文

页码: 427-434

在线出版日期: 2009-06-01（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）