A Comparison of Price and Quantity Competition in a Retailer-Dominant Channel

摘要：

This article analyzes the non-cooperative game on the choice of strategic variable (price or quantity) to set in the channel with a dominant-retailer with two upstream manufacturers which produce different products. We found that the variable choice of the retailer makes no effect on the equilibrium result. Regard to manufacturers, when products are substitutes (complements) and the degree of cross effect is sufficient large, their best strategy is to choose quantity (price) as strategic variable.

关键词： Game Theory Stackelberg Game Price Competition Quantity Competition

作者: Hsun-Jung Cho Chien-Lun Lan Hou-Kit Mak

作者单位: Department of Transportation Technology and Management National Chiao Tung University,1001 Ta Hsueh Road, Hsinchu, Taiwan

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: The First World Congress on Global Optimization in Engineering & Science(第一届工程与科学全局优化国际会议 WCGO2009)

会议地点: 长沙

会议语种:英文

页码: 468-474

在线出版日期: 2009-06-01（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）