Share the Multicast Payment Fairly

摘要：

In this paper, we study how to share the payments to relay links among the receivers for multicast. Based on a strategyproof mechanism whose multicast tree is at most 2 times the optimal, we propose a payment sharing scheme that is 1/n2-budget-balanced, crossmonotonic, and in the core. We also prove that there is no payment sharing scheme that can achieve βbudget-balance and cross-monotonicity for β=Ω(1/n). When both the relay agents and the receivers are selfish, we show a negative result: combining a strategyproof mechanism for the relay agents and a strategyproof sharing scheme for the receivers does not necessarily imply a strategyproof mechanism overall.

作者: WeiZhao Wang Xiang-Yang Li Zheng Sun

作者单位: Illinois Institute of Technology, Chicago, IL, USA Hong Kong Baptist University, Hong Kong, China

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: The 11th Annual International Computing and Combinatorics Conference COCOON 2005(第11届国际计算和组合会议)

会议地点: 昆明

会议语种:英文

页码: 210-219

在线出版日期: 2005-08-01（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）