Optimal Threshold in the Group-buying Auction with Replenishment Postponement

摘要：

The group-buying auction is often used in the B2C market. The seller here is offered a quantitydiscount-price contract and implements a replenishment postponement policy. We show that when customers valuation follows a uniform distribution,the group-buying auction does not always outperform the fixed pricing. The optimal groupbuying threshold is shown to depend on only purchasing costs,prices and the upper bound of customers valuation.

关键词： Group-buying replenishment postponement threshold

作者: Li Du JieJian Feng

作者单位: School of Economics & Management,Xidian University,Xian,China Faculty of Business,Hong Kong Polytechnic University,Hong Kong

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: 2009 IEEE 16th International Conference on Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management(IEEE第16届工业工程与工程管理国际学术会议)

会议地点: 北京

会议语种:英文

页码: 181-184

在线出版日期: 2009-10-21（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）