Research on Service Patent Licensing Risk under Asymmetric Information

摘要：

The existence of asymmetric information makes the process of the patent license become a game process among the participants. This article studies the moral risk which patentees will face when the licensed patent is service patent, puts the emphasis on the risking relations between the patentees and the inventors, designs an optimal incentive mechanism for the inventors using principal-agent theory, sets up a model, analyzes the impact imposed by risk attitude, inventors effort cost and other factors on the model, draws some conclusions that the patentees cannot hold the more conservative attitudes towards the risk, and so on.

关键词： Service Patent Licensing Risk Asymmetric Information Principal-agent Model

作者: Wang Xin Jia Yuanhua Ma Xiaofei

作者单位: School of Transportation,Beijing Jiaotong University,Beijing,P.R.China,100044 Distance and Continuing Education Department,BUPT,Beijing,P.R.China,100876

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: 2009 IEEE 16th International Conference on Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management(IEEE第16届工业工程与工程管理国际学术会议)

会议地点: 北京

会议语种:英文

页码: 478-481

在线出版日期: 2009-10-21（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）