The bilateral information asymmetry on insurance market
This paper restudies the incompletely insuring condition under the influence of adverse selection in insurance market. First of all,this paper demonstrates the bilateral information asymmetry on the insurance market. Following that,through the application of Karush-Kuhn-Tucker Theorem,this paper deduces this condition newly. Finally,this paper draws the conclusion that insurance confpany should control the compensation amount through the design of insurance contract.
Adverse selection Information asymmetry Karush-Kuhn-Tucker Theorem Risk-averse Risk-seeking The incompletely insuring condition
Bao-Long Li Xue-Qing Wang Zhi-Qing Fan
Management School of Tianjin University,Tianjin,300072,China
国际会议
北京
英文
750-752
2009-10-21（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）