Coordinating Price Model for Retailer Dominant in a Two-echelon Supply Chain
This paper proposed a coordinating pricing model,in which the retailer occupies a leading position. Coordinating pricing is a practice that a manufacturer pays a retailer a portion of sales promotion expenses in order to induce sales. Comparing with other relative studies,we assume the market demand is not only influenced by retail price but also by sales promotion expenses. With the game theory,we analyses and find out Stackelberg equilibrium solution,manufacturers,retailers and systems maximum expected profits. Furthermore,through the economic analysis on the sales promotion expenses share ratio,we find manufactures optimal share ratio depends on the demand sensitivity to the retail price and to the sales promotion expenses and get the optimal sales promotion expenses share ratio that optimizes the entire Two-echelon supply chain.
supply chain Stackelberg game coordinating pricing
Jiang Meixian Yan Lianlian Jin Shousong Feng Dingzhong
Institute of Industrial Engineering and Logistical Engineering,The MOE Key Laboratory of Mechanical Manufacture and Automation,Zhejiang University of Technology,Hangzhou,P.R.China,310032
国际会议
北京
英文
1474-1477
2009-10-21（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）