Moral Risk Management of Open-ended Fund Based on Dynamic Game
Based on the perspective of dynamic game,an analysis on the main performance of moral risks of open-ended fund is made and a multi-stage dynamic co-operation game model of open-ended fund is given as well. Then deep-seated reasons that have hindered cooperative game of several parties and caused moral hazards to the open-ended funds are listed. In the end,countermeasures and suggestions to reduce the moral risks of open-ended fund are put forward.
Principal agent dynamic game open-ended fund moral risk
Dong Rifang Wang Zhihong Wang Dan
College of Business Administration,Liaoning Technical University,Huludao,P.R.China,125105
国际会议
北京
英文
1754-1758
2009-10-21（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）