Professional Credit Guarantee Principle-agent Relationship Model
By using the allocation of guarantee rate saving as incentive mechanism and considering the external supervision mechanism in credit guarantee contract,the principal-agent relationships between professional credit guarantee institution and small and medium sized enterprise (SME) is investigated in this paper. It has been proved that external supervision mechanism could not change the optimal effort level of SME under the symmetric information,while,the professional guarantee institution by using effective external supervision mechanism under the asymmetric information could make sME choose higher effort level and increase the incentive strength of guarantee institution. With the external supervision being reinforced by professional credit guarantee institution,the incentive strength is much stronger and expected revenue is much higher,while,the agent cost is less. Suitable and effective external supervision can decrease the total guarantee cost of professional credit guarantee institution.
Professional credit guarantee institution SME,principal-agent relationships ezternal supervision mechanism incentive mechanism
X.L.Cui D.Z.Wang Y.L.Zhuang
School of Economics and Management,Liaoning Shi Hua University,Fushun,China School of Information Science and Engineering,Northeastern University,Shenyang,China School of Business Administration,Northeastern University,Shenyang,China
国际会议
北京
英文
1798-1802
2009-10-21（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）