Evolutionary Prisoners Dilemma Game on Small-world Network

摘要：

This paper simulates the Prisoner’s Dilemma Game on small-world networks. Previous work has paid many attentions to the effect of spatial structures on cooperative behavior. We consider the benefit of the cooperative behavior. It is found that, although at p=0.1 small-world region, neither the total payoffs nor the frequency of cooperators reaches a climax, and these two indicators increase rapidly in this area. Moreover, the standardized payoffs vary with frequency of cooperators positively and proportionally and a line fits well. Randomness is a positive element for cooperation and cooperative behavior brings benefit.

作者: Min Lin Nan Li, Jr. Hui Guo

作者单位: College of Economics and Management,Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Nanjing 2100 College of Economics and Management,Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics,Nanjing 21001 College of Economics and Management,Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Nanjing 2111

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: 2009 IEEE International Conference on Grey System and Intelligent Services(2009 IEEE灰色系统与服务科学国际会议)

会议地点: 南京

会议语种:英文

页码: 529-532

在线出版日期: 2009-10-20（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）