Game Analysis on Banking Risk Supervision under Asymmetric Information
Banks have boosted growth at the country level, at the industry level, and at the firm level. The positive effect of banks on economic development is robust to different econometric methods. Harmonized development of national economy is based on financial stability. Each side of supervision will chose its strategy according to the other side of the game to make the revenue maximized. In this paper, we analyze risk taking by banks, the strategy of banking supervisory. And bank under asymmetric information is anglicized based on game theory, and game model is established under the conditions of asymmetric information and is simulated in order to bring some new ideas for the banking risk supervision of China.
Ma Xin
School of Management and Economics, North China University of Water Conservancy and Electric Power, Zhengzhou, P.R. China 450011
国际会议
2009 IEEE International Conference on Grey System and Intelligent Services(2009 IEEE灰色系统与服务科学国际会议)
南京
英文
1177-1181
2009-10-20（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）