A Study of First-price Sealed-bid Procurement Auctions for Divisible Items

摘要：

In this paper,we study first-price sealed-bid procurement auctions for divisible items. The auctions are divided into two cases: the auctioneer either does or does not compensate for an oversupply of the quantity purchased. The bidding behaviors of bidders are modeled,and then the optimal bidding strategy for bidders is obtained.It is shown that the bidders bidding price exists and is increasing in his cost.Moreover,we show that the bidder can gain more profit in cases where the auctioneer compensates the overage supply quantity.

关键词： Procurement auctions First-price sealed-bid Optimal bidding strategy

作者: Yihua Wei Qiying Hu Wuyi Yue

作者单位: College of Management,Shanghai University,Shanghai 200444,China School of Management,Fudan University,Shanghai 200433,China Department of Intelligence and Informatics,Konan University,Kobe 658-8501,Japan

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: The 8th International Symposium on Operations Research and Its Applications(第八届运筹及其应用国际专题讨论会 ISORA09)

会议地点: 张家界

会议语种:英文

页码: 409-416

在线出版日期: 2009-09-20（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）