A GAME-THEORETIC ANALYSIS OF TCP VEGAS AND FAST TCP

摘要：

In this paper, we evaluate the impact of selfish behavior through a game-theoretic analysis of TCP Vegas and FAST TCP. By theoretical analysis, we obtain the Nash Equilibrium in these games and study the loss of efficiency under Nash Equilibrium. Our results show that if the users are selfish, then the efficiency of the network as a whole relies on the utility function of individual users. The efficiency of the system degrades under some conditions and remains optimal under other conditions. This motivates us to borrow the notions of Price of Anarchy and Tragedy of the Commons in Game Theory to describe this efficiency loss. We calculate the Price of Anarchy and provide the necessary and sufficient condition under which the TCP Vegas Game (FAST TCP Game) is a Tragedy of the Commons. Finally, we validate the theoretical results by the simulations carried out using NS-2.

关键词： TCP Game Theory Price of Anarchy Tragedy of the Commons

作者: Zhenhua Liu Xiaoping Zhang Dong Wang Youjian Zhao Hongtao Guan

作者单位: Department of Computer Science and Technology, Tsinghua University Beijing 100084, China

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: China-Ireland International Conference on Information and Communications Technologies 2008(2008 中国-爱尔兰信息与通信技术国际会议 CIICT 2008)

会议地点: 北京

会议语种:英文

页码: 1-5

在线出版日期: 2008-09-26（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）