Reverse channel decision for the closed-loop supply chain with competing manufacturers and one dominant retailer
Reverse channel decision has great influence in the efficiency of closed-loop supply chain operation. To deal this problem, the reverse channel decision was studied based on non-cooperative game in the closedloop supply chain with competing manufacturers and one dominant retailer, which is more ubiquitous in the realism. Results indicate that the competitive degree of manufacturers, the difficulty of collection and the remanufacturing cost saving affect the result of reverse channel decision together; both manufacturers collect used products directly from customers when the competitive degree is lower and both manufacturers utilize the dominant retailer to collect used products indirectly when it is higher than its critical value; the critical value is related to the difficulty of collection and the remanufacturing cost saving.
Closed-loop supply chain Competition Dominant retailer Reverse channel Non-cooperative game
HAN Xiaohua
School of Management Guangdong University of Technology Guangzhou,China
国际会议
上海
英文
1369-1375
2009-11-20（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）