Why Does Villager Participate in Grass-root Election in Rural China? Perspective from Village Public Goods Demand

摘要：

Grass-root election in rural China is the hot issue concerned by many scholars. Although most of them study the impact factors of the villagers to participate in the election, they did not answer whats the economic incentive for villagers to participate in the election, this article explains it insentively. First we propose a theoretic hypothesis regarding to grass-root election based on Tiebouts public finance theory, then introduce three variables to measure households demand for three different public goods provided by village. Furthermore, we use the village survey data from rural China to build Logit and Probit model to test the hypothesis. The empirical results show that three coefficients are significant positive, which means the household who has more village public goods demand has more likely to take part in grass-root election. This result directly reveals the households incentive for grass-root election and it can help us to understand the effect of election on public goods provision.

关键词： Grass-root election public goods demand economic incentive

作者: YANG Dan ZHANG Yuan

作者单位: The Research Center of Rural Economics and Management,Southwest University,Chongqing,400716;Agricult China Center for Economics Studies,Fudan University,Shanghai,P.R.China,200433

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: 2009 International Conference on Management Science and Engineering(2009管理科学与工程国际会议)

会议地点: 北京

会议语种:英文

页码: 65-71

在线出版日期: 2009-11-01（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）