Analysis on the Game Model of Transaction Parties in E-commerce

摘要：

The information asymmetry has seriously hindered the development of E-commerce. Merchants have the superiority of information, while consumers are in a disadvantaged position in this aspect. This paper only discusses whether the merchant takes an honesty strategy or not. Therefore, merchants strategy options include the honesty or dishonesty strategy, and consumers strategy options include buying or nobuying. Accordingly, this paper built the game model for both parties in E-commerce transactions. After solving and analyzing it, we find: ① When R1 ≥ R2 (R1 is the merchants benefit when merchants choose the honesty strategy and consumers choose the buying strategy; R2 is the merchants benefit when merchants choose the dishonesty strategy and consumers choose the buying strategy), the model has an unique Nash equilibrium solution (honesty, buying); ② When R1 <R2, the model, which is a mixed strategy with complete information, does not has an unique Nash equilibrium solution. Based on the analysis above, this paper then put forward a number of countermeasures and proposals through which the proceed from taking the honesty strategy for merchants is greater than or equal to that from taking the dishonesty strategy, namely R1 ≥ R2.

关键词： Information asymmetry E-commerce game complete information static game Nash equilibrium

作者: QIN Dezhi ZOU Lifang

作者单位: School of Business & Tourism Management,Yunnan University,No.2 North Cuihu Road Kunming,650091

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: 2009 International Conference on Management Science and Engineering(2009管理科学与工程国际会议)

会议地点: 北京

会议语种:英文

页码: 814-819

在线出版日期: 2009-11-01（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）