Evolutionary Analysis on Safety Governance Between Clients and Government Supervision Departments in Construction Projects
Aimed to the problem of construction project safety production which arouses publics wide attention, to strengthen safety governance has urgently become social responsibility that cant be shifted off by clients and government supervision departments. This paper sets up an unsymmetrical game model of governments safety supervision department and clients. Based on evolutionary game theory, helpful advice to safety supervision department and clients is put forward. This paper argues that the idealized evolutionary stable state that clients actively carry on safety strategy and governments safety supervision department also actively supervises clients cannot be achieved. Governments safety supervision department should effectively deal with the relationship of governments safety supervision cost, penalty on clients, clients safety investment and so on in order to induce clients to actively carry on safety strategy.
safety governance governments supervision evolutionary game
ZHANG Jing
School of Economics and Management, Southwest Jiaotong University, Chengdu, P.R.China, 610031
国际会议
The 5th International Sympsium for Corporate Governance(第五届公司治理国际研讨会)
天津
英文
161-168
2009-09-01（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）