Soft Budget Constraint, Continuous Operation and Drift of Risk Preference of Investors--The Evidence from Laboratory Ezperiment

摘要：

Since the 1980s, scholars have extensively refined thought about the concept of Kornais soft budget constraint. If soft budget constraint does exist, as a fact or self-evident customary practice, it will naturally form an institutional arrangement on the belief-level of the investors, thereby changes their preferences. Among the large number of literatures, we are the first to use the method of laboratory experiment to verify this phenomenon. This paper designs a soft budget constraint market with 4 kinds of treatment variables. The experimental results indicate that: (1) soft budget constraint strengthens the risk preference of investors; (2) the continuous operation plays a reverse role in risk preference. That is to say, soft budget constraint strengthens the risk preference of investors, while continuous operation weakens it; in the same continuous operation circumstance, the soft budget constraint increases the risk preference of investors.

关键词： Soft Budget Constraint Risk Preference Drift Laboratory Ezperiment

作者: LI Jianbiao WANG Guangrong YUAN Xue

作者单位: Research Center of Corporate Governance /Business School, Nankai University, No.94 Weijin Road,Tianjin, P.R.China, 300071

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: The 5th International Sympsium for Corporate Governance(第五届公司治理国际研讨会)

会议地点: 天津

会议语种:英文

页码: 169-174

在线出版日期: 2009-09-01（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）