Empirical Studies of Chinese Listed Companies Control Right
The control rights of Chinese listed companies are studied by probabilistic voting models in different resolution mechanisms in this article. Through the measurement on 1519 listed companies control rights and controlling shareholding, some serious flaw questions on control rights are discovered and these are universally existed in Chinese listed companies. Especially under the special resolution mechanism, overage and loss of control rights are both prominent, and in massive companies there are serious risks that the largest shareholders lose their control rights. The empirical results show some relationship of control rights, a complex correlation with stock price, a negative relationship with profit ability and debt level, a positive relationship with the enterprise size, and the control rights of private enterprises is obviously lower than stateowned business.
Corporate governance Control rights Resolution mechanism Controlling shareholding
WANG Wei ZHANG Xiaoqian
Center for Research of Private Economy, College of Economics, Zhejiang University, China, 310027
国际会议
The 5th International Sympsium for Corporate Governance(第五届公司治理国际研讨会)
天津
英文
234-240
2009-09-01（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）