Institutional Investors Shareholding and Equity Cost--Empirical Evidence from Chinese Security Market
Corporate equity cost can represent the level of corporate proxy cost efficiently. The paper studied the impact of institutional investor shareholding on corporate governance by equity cost. The empirical result verifies that when controlling corporate size, there is a highly notable negative relation between institutional investors shareholding and corporate systematic risk, institutional investors shareholding and corporate equity cost, thus verifies that as institutional investors have advantage in size, information and personnel, they can monitor corporate efficiently, thus decrease proxy cost, corporate systematic risk and equity cost.
Institutional investor corporate governance corporate systematic risk equity costs
FAN Haifeng HU Yuming
Management School, Jinan University, Guangzhou, P.R. China, 510632 Economic and Management School, N Management School, Jinan University, Guangzhou, P.R. China, 510632
国际会议
The 5th International Sympsium for Corporate Governance(第五届公司治理国际研讨会)
天津
英文
465-470
2009-09-01(万方平台首次上网日期,不代表论文的发表时间)