Corporate Control Arrangement, Tunneling and the Long-term Post-acquisition Performance of Acquirers: Empirical Evidence from Listed Firms in China

摘要：

We study the effect of corporate control arrangement on the long-term post-acquisition performance of acquirers from the tunneling perspective in this paper. Our empirical evidence reveals three points. First, the acquirer performance is worse when ultimate controller cash flow right is low. Second, the longer the control chain between the ultimate controller and listed firm is, the worse the performance of the acquirer is. Third, when other big shareholders of listed firm possess strong equity restriction capacities, the performance is relatively better. The results of this paper may contribute to supervise the M&A activities from the corporate control arrangement perspective in China.

关键词： Control right Performance of acquirers Tunneling Ultimate controller

作者: XU Yanfang CAO Wei WEN Kuangyu

作者单位: Business School, Renmin University of China, Beijing, P.R.China, 100872

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: The 5th International Sympsium for Corporate Governance(第五届公司治理国际研讨会)

会议地点: 天津

会议语种:英文

页码: 633-643

在线出版日期: 2009-09-01（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）