An Empirical Ezamination of Compensation Committee and Pay-performance Sensitivity: Evidence from A-share Listed Companies in China
This paper examines the efficiency of compensation committee in Chinas listed companies based on the relation between executive compensation and performance indicators. Using data of A-share listed companies from 2002 to 2008 to investigate the effect of compensation committee on performance sensitivity. We find that under current market conditions the function of compensation committee governance can be further improved. Although the compensation committee doesnt increase the sensitivity between accounting performance and compensation, it decreases the sensitivity between market performance and compensation. As compensation committee is established in China since 2002, and is not mandatory, there exist still many problems, these problems require further reforms to this system, and this paper may provide some clues for future reform.
Compensation committee Ezecutive compensation Accounting performance Market performance Cash flow form operation
MAO Hongtao ZHOU Dayong WANG Xin
School of Accounting, Southwest University of Finance and Economics, P.R. China, 611130 School of International Business, Southwest University of Finance and Economics, P.R.China,611130
国际会议
The 5th International Sympsium for Corporate Governance(第五届公司治理国际研讨会)
天津
英文
689-695
2009-09-01（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）