The Inverted N-shaped Relationship Between Managerial Stock Ownership Incentive and Corporate Performance: Ezperience and Enlightenment of Japanese Listed Companies
There are two contradictive views between the managerial stock ownership and corporate performance in theoretical study, but different opinions in empirical study. Applying the model of panel data based on the samples of Japanese companies, the research results show that the inverted N-shaped relationship is obviously presented between the managerial stock ownership and corporate performance. The policy enlightenment is that the emphasis to implement incentive mechanism of managers stock right in China is not to increase the proportion of share ownership, but to design the reasonable interval of share ownership. In this interval, the convergence-of-interests effects can be full exerted, and the entrenchment effects cannot be induced.
Japan Managerial Stock ownership corporate performance panel data
LI Bin ZHANG Jun LI Hongying
Japan Studies Institute, Liaoning University, P.R.China, 110036 Asia-Australia Business College, Liaoning University, China, 110036 College of Economy, Liaoning University, China, 110036
国际会议
The 5th International Sympsium for Corporate Governance(第五届公司治理国际研讨会)
天津
英文
696-699
2009-09-01（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）