Manager Talents, Corporate Governance and Benchmark Effect:The Determination of Ezecutive Compensation in Chinese Listed Firms
This paper seeks to investigate the determinants shaping the evolution of Chinese executive compensation under the impact of market oriented reforms and global governance convergence during the latest three decades. Based on contract theory and behaviour approach, we propose three hypotheses from the perspective of functioning manager market, manager power and benchmark effect in pay setting process given Chinese transitional institution background. Based on a balanced panel data of 502 listed firms surviving at least ten years until 2006, we find that the increasing executive pay level reflects competitive market demand for manager talents. However, well framed corporate governance mechanisms as restraints to manager power can not fulfil effectively. Moreover, Chinese executives in firms closer to higher benchmark of foreign peers tend to receive generous pay package, this benchmark effect has been magnified by the role of compensation committee in pay setting process.
Benchmark Effect Corporate Governance China Ezecutive Compensation
LIU Xuguang CHEN Jean Jinghan LI Weian
School of Management, University of Surrey, Guildford, Surrey, GU2 7XH, UK Business School, Research School of Management, University of Surrey, Guildford, Surrey, GU2 7XH, UK Business School, Research Centre for Corporate Governance, Nankai University, P.R.C., 300071
国际会议
The 5th International Sympsium for Corporate Governance(第五届公司治理国际研讨会)
天津
英文
759-770
2009-09-01（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）