The Character of Factual Controllers, Government Rent-seeking, and Private Benefits of Control--The Evidence from the Negotiated Share Transfer
The paper tries to analyze and study the rentcreating behavior in the negotiated share transfer activities which controlled by government and find that the private benefits of control(PBC)of companies controlled by governments is notably lower than the companies controlled by non-governments in the situation of acquiring rent from buyers. The double roles as economic people and social people drives governments to make different balanced choices in view of multi-goal function, and produces the discrepancy of PBC: The PBC of the Chinese listed companies controlled by the central governments is lower than that in the companies controlled by the local governments; The administrative post of local governments appear a reverse relation with PBC. These conclusions will provide another elucidative perspective for the trading substances of free transfer platform built by the Reform of Non-tradable Shares of our country.
The character of factual controllers Government Rent-seeking Private benefits of control
XUE Yulian XIE Xiangbing QIAO Wei
School of Accountant, Henan Finance University, China, 450002 School of Accountant, Nanjing University, China, 210093
国际会议
The 5th International Sympsium for Corporate Governance(第五届公司治理国际研讨会)
天津
英文
906-917
2009-09-01（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）