Research of Managerial Behavior Control Inside the Firm Based on Implicit Control Mechanism
This paper discussed the relationship between intrinsic motivation and extrinsic incentive, confirmed their status in incentive mechanism design. By modeling analysis, we propose an implicit control mechanism of managers inside the firm. We found that intrinsic motivation can exert significant incentive effect to the agents behavior, which can improve the agents effort. We argue that the need to motivate workers may make it beneficial for a self-interested, short-sighted manager to pursue the long-term viability of a firm. When the firm is in a stable environment, this implicit control mechanism may not contradict shareholder value maximization. However, when the firm needs restructuring, this mechanism diminishes firm value. We discuss when external governance is desirable, and when it is not. Our model also offers economic explanations for some related issues in managerial behavior, such as restructuring aversion and excessive risk aversion.
Corporate Governance Implicit Control Mechanism Worker Incentives Intrinsic motivation
WU Yong ZHU Weidong
School of Management, Hefei University of Technology, Hefei, P.R.China, 230009
国际会议
The 5th International Sympsium for Corporate Governance(第五届公司治理国际研讨会)
天津
英文
1388-1395
2009-09-01（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）