Can Board Secretary Improve the Quality of Information Disclosure?— An Empirical Study on Chinese Listed Companies
In 2006, CSRC (China Securities Regulatory Commission) required listed companies to improve corporate governance through enforcing the function of board secretary (secretary to board of directors). There had been no specification on the position of board secretary before the Company Law was amended, which is the immediate reason why it had been vacant on the secretary position in listed companies. The amended Company Law approved the position of the board secretary legally for the first time, which will probably improve the quality of information disclosure of listed companies. This paper adopts the measurement method proposed by Kim and Verrecchia (2001) to measure the quality of information disclosure. Through empirically investigating the constituent companies of Shanghai-Shenzhen 300 index, we find the following results. After the enforcement of the amended Company Law, the quality of information disclosure of the listed companies has been improved largely. Besides, the secretarys shareholding reduces the quality of information disclosure. However, other characteristics of secretary, including age, tenure, education level, dual positions, and related work experience, have no significant impact on the quality of information disclosure.
Board Secretary Quality of Information Disclosure Amended Company Law Event Study Method
ZHOU Kaiguo LI Tao ZHANG Yan
Lingnan College, Sun Yat-sen University, Guangzhou, China, 510275 School of Economics, Central University of Finance and Economics, Beijing, China, 100081 China Merchants Bank, Shenzhen, China, 518040
国际会议
The 5th International Sympsium for Corporate Governance(第五届公司治理国际研讨会)
天津
英文
1552-1566
2009-09-01（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）