Chinese Independent Directors Reputation and Labor Market Efficiency
This paper is to examine the Chinese independent directors reputation on the basis of prior theories and Chinese background. A theoretical model is set up to test the agent problem between the independent directors and the shareholders, which shows that through controlling the election of the independent directors, the large shareholder tends to keep the independent directors reputation incentive in a low level to maximize their own interest. The result of the empirical study shows that the large shareholders specially choose their own independent directors, so the independent directors are lack of reputation incentives to supervise and the labor market is basically lack of efficiency. This paper suggests that the independent directors should be elected by the minority shareholders to ensure that the large shareholder be supervised.
Reputation of Independent Directors Labor Market of Independent Directors Large Shareholder Control
CHEN Yan
Lingnan College, Sun Yat-sen University, Guangzhou, China, 510275
国际会议
The 5th International Sympsium for Corporate Governance(第五届公司治理国际研讨会)
天津
英文
1567-1578
2009-09-01（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）