会议专题

Supervision of Independent Directors and Top Ezecutive Turnover:Empirical Evidence from Chinas Listed Firms Based on Panel Data

Using a sample of Chinese listed firms for the period 2004-2007, we measure the supervision of independent directors with six dimensions. We find that the supervision of independent directors had very significant positive effects on turnover of top executives. We further find that the proportion of independent directors, separation of CEO and Chairman, the number of accounting experts and reputation had important effects on turnover of top executives. The effects of stock holding shares ratio of the biggest boarder were secondary and allowance had relative small influence on it, which refl ected that independent directors did not have enough incentive to supervise.

independent directors supervision turnover of top ezecutives

QIU Qian

School of Management, Shandong University, China 250100

国际会议

The 5th International Sympsium for Corporate Governance(第五届公司治理国际研讨会)

天津

英文

1587-1595

2009-09-01(万方平台首次上网日期,不代表论文的发表时间)