CEO Turnover, Corporate Governance and Investor Protection:Evidence from the Listed Companies in Post-SSR Era of China
CEO turnover is an important mechanism of corporate governance, which involves in the efficiency of investors protection. Using the post split-share structure of China as the background, this paper researches the causes of CEO turnover and the performance effect and value effect of the turnover from the perspective of performance. The empirical study result shows that loss and decline of accounting income will cause CEO turnover significantly, the probability of CEO turnover for firms with profit has higher sensitivity while its performance decline than that of those loss firm. At the same time, the author finds CEO turn has stronger value effect, which can increase the firms market value significantly, but not for accounting performance. For the loss firms, both the value effect and performance effect are all evident, and far greater than those of profit firms. The results of this paper have reference and implication significance for improving CEO governance and investors protection.
CEO turnover corporate governance investor protection split-share structure reform
ZHANG Hongliang
Business School, Beijing Technology and Business University, P.R.China 100048 Mobile Post-doctoral Center of Business Administration, Nankai University, P.R.China 300071
国际会议
The 5th International Sympsium for Corporate Governance(第五届公司治理国际研讨会)
天津
英文
1636-1644
2009-09-01（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）